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INTRODUCTION
Having a physical body is not sufficient to experience the feeling of having a body. This
somewhat staggering assumption has long been demonstrated by studies on phantom limbs
(Ramachandran, 1998), distortions of body image following right brain damage (Hécaen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952), and experimentally induced body illusions (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998;
Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). A critical issue is now to understand which mechanisms underlie
bodily experience (de Vignemont, 2010), a prerequisite to develop studies on tool incorporation,
and neurorehabilitation. That being said, the orientation of research strongly depends on the
selected epistemological options. The present work aims at discussing two epistemological options,
one being representational (i.e., bodily experience relies on the activation of specific cognitive
modules devoted to body representations), and the other being structuralist (i.e., bodily experience
is an epiphenomenon of both multisensory integration and cognition).
DEFINING BODY SCHEMA AND BODY IMAGE
Classical taxonomies (Sirigu et al., 1991; Schwoebel and Coslett, 2005) have made a distinction
between three body representations. First, the body schema is an immediate sensorimotor
representation that specifies the relative positions of body parts in space over time (Buxbaum,
2001). Second, body semantics are of conceptual and linguistic nature, and describe the functions
and categories of body parts (e.g., both the wrist and elbow are joints). Third, the body structural
description is mainly of visual nature and provides individuals with knowledge on the normal
structure of the body (e.g., relative positions of body parts; Goldenberg, 1995). It is a long-term
body representation that may also be broken down into a general body image (e.g., knowing
that all humans have two arms) and an individual body image (i.e., the stable representation of
one’s own body over time). The latter implies that individual experience plays a key role in body
representation (i.e., the habitual body; Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Due to the conceptual ambiguity of
these concepts (de Vignemont, 2010), we shall use the “bodily experience” label as a whole category
encompassing body schema and body image and, more generally, the experience of having a body.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES
The abovementioned taxonomy admits that distinct cognitive modules are devoted to specific
body representations. Nevertheless, “there are so many bodily disorders, and therefore so many
possible dissociations, that one would end up with an almost infinite list of body representations”
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(de Vignemont, 2010, p. 7). In this view, the virtually infinite
multiplication of cognitive modules would result in unfalsifiable
theories of bodily experience (see also De Vignemont, 2007).
It follows that a scientific theory should rely on a limited
number of cognitive modules. However, if that is so, why are
there so many different bodily disorders (de Vignemont, 2010)?
Perhaps one solution would be to consider theoretical options
of structuralism, an epistemological account initially developed
in linguistics (De Saussure, 1915), and anthropology (Lévi-
Strauss, 1958), and occasionally applied to neurological patients
(Sabouraud, 1995).
The main assumptions of structuralism are as follows. (1)
The human mind consists of a minimum set of modular
components (i.e., the structure), the number of which is limited
by their universality (e.g., all humans are capable of language
independently of the multiplicity of languages). This is consistent
with the modularity and universality of mind assumed in
cognitive psychology (Marr, 1982; Fodor, 1983). However, (2)
the diversity of individual experiences does not reflect the
activity of specific cognitive modules but rather is incidental
and conjuncture-dependent: Different individual experiences
may lead to infinite variations of individual psychological
conformations (e.g., the painting), and yet the underlying
structure should be the same across individuals (e.g., the
canvas). (3) Components of the mind are interdependent rather
than independent, sequential and hierarchical. “Heterarchy”
FIGURE 1 | Two epistemological accounts of bodily experience. (A) The cognitive account of bodily experience. Specific body representations determine bodily
experience, while additional, non-specific cognitive components modulate the expression of these representations. (B) The structuralist account of bodily experience.
There are no body-specific representations. Instead, all of the cognitive processes (not necessarily body-specific) interfere with multisensory integration, which results
in bodily experience. Cognitive dimensions also interact with each other (small gray bidirectional arrows), resulting in various phenomena. Adopted from https://
pixabay.com/fr/service/license/.
may better reflect the complexity and non-linearity of brain
activity (Fuster, 2009). (4) By contrast with strict modularity,
sensations are processed by all of the components simultaneously
(e.g., one familiar tool is simultaneously the object of both
semantic and technical reasoning; Osiurak, 2014). This amounts
to considering that components of the mind interfere with one
another (i.e., the interference hypothesis) in the construction
of phenomena (e.g., human written language may result from
the interaction of language and technics; Gagnepain, 1990). On
this account, perhaps bodily experience does not reflect specific
body representations, but rather results from the interaction of
all human cognitive skills (Figure 1).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF BODILY
EXPERIENCE
Even though structuralism is questionable for being too holistic,
over the past few years embodied cognition experiments
provided data consistent with the interference hypothesis. But
before demonstrating relationships between bodily experience
and any cognitive mechanism, it is necessary to delineate specific
neurological mechanisms underlying bodily experience. In this
regard, it is argued that multisensory integration is a prerequisite
to experiment the unity and continuity of the body and self,
and that interference with additional cognitive dimensions may
underlie various body-related phenomena.
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Multi-Sensory Integration as a
Body-Specific Process?
Before the advent of cognitive architectures, bodily experience
has long been viewed by neurologists as an epiphenomenon
of multisensory integration (i.e., the combination of sensations
arising from different modalities and brain regions; Bonnier,
1905; Head and Holmes, 1911; see also de Vignemont, 2010;
Longo and Haggard, 2012a,b). The latter is at the root of body
unity (e.g., one can perceive her/his hand as a unitary body
part because she/he sees and feels it at the same point in
space) and makes it possible to distinguish between self and
non-self (e.g., objects, others) stimulations. More recent body
illusion experiments have revived and extended this multisensory
account of body ownership (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008).
Multisensory integration depends on the activity of multiple
brain regions including the sensory, premotor, posterior parietal,
temporal superior, and internal cortex (Wiener, 1996; Calvert
and Thesen, 2004; Petkova et al., 2011a; Ursino et al., 2014;
Yau et al., 2015). Remarkably, these regions are not specific to
bodily experience for they are also involved in cognitive functions
like memory, visuospatial, praxis, and social skills. It is then
plausible that these brain regions are actually not body-specific
but contribute to bodily experience.
Cognition and the Body
This section enumerates, non-exhaustively, findings/hypotheses
that are in line with the interference hypothesis (i.e., the
interaction between cognition and bodily experience).
Bodily Experience and Perceptual Analysis
It has long been assumed that body schema/image is independent
from perceptual analysis. Nevertheless, well-known works have
demonstrated that the physical characteristics of the body have an
impact on visuospatial analysis (Proffitt, 2006). Likewise, motor
imagery (i.e., the ability to mentally simulate movements of
specific body parts) presumably involves the body schema but
is sensitive to peripheral bodily conditions like chronic pain
(Breckenridge et al., 2019). Therefore, body representations seem
to be highly dependent on immediate bodily experience, and it is
no longer possible to admit full independence between personal,
and extrapersonal perception.
Bodily Experience and Action
In the field of apraxia, categorical apprehension (i.e., the ability
to select and combine parts of multipart objects into a whole
configuration) deficits may account for both apraxia of tool use
and visuo-imitative apraxia (Goldenberg, 2009), two disorders
that have been explained by either body schema (Buxbaum,
2001), or body image deficits (Goldenberg, 1995). Remarkably,
categorical apprehension may be the direct psychological
expression of the particular neuronal architecture of the left
parietal lobe (rather than a specific cognitive module), which
is why it may apply to both body, and non-body stimuli
indiscriminately (i.e., body parts and objects). In the same
vein, technical reasoning (i.e., the ability to infer tool/object
characteristics that are relevant to achieve a given goal; Osiurak,
2014) might condition the selection of body parts during action
(e.g., one may use her/his nails to play scratch-card games
because nails have the same properties as coins to achieve the goal
of scratching).
Bodily Experience and Language
Interestingly, a similar differentiation/combination function
prevails in the field of linguistics (De Saussure, 1915), and
presumably underlies categorization and concept formation
(i.e., the ability to identify and group recurrent information
across infinite experiences; Vallila-Rohter and Kiran, 2015). It
is not surprising then, that correlations are frequently observed
between gestures conveying meaning on the one hand, and
language on the other hand (Vingerhoets et al., 2013). Actually,
many works consistently demonstrated the bidirectional
relationships between language and the body, especially action
(Schwartz et al., 2008; Shebani and Pulvermüller, 2018), and
body part localization (Mattioni and Longo, 2014). Perhaps
bodily experience not only develops under the influence of
language, but also varies greatly in everyday life by the mere fact
of thinking and talking.
Bodily Experience and Semantic Memory
Broadly speaking, body semantics correspond to knowledge
about the body and are independent from the body schema.
Nevertheless, these representations are more intermingled than
expected. Conceptual knowledge on body parts grows as a
function of their involvement in action (Auclair Jambaqué and
Jambaqué, 2015), and children with spinal cord injury may show
selective deficits of body image (Salvato et al., 2017). It follows
that body semantics are not the mere result of explicit, didactic
learning but also of embodied, individual experience. The fact
that body image can be selectively impaired in adults can be
understood as an effect of culture-dependent brain plasticity.
After all, partially different brain regions may underlie English
and Greek in bilingual individuals and yet, they are not the
expression of completely different cognitive processes (Ekiert,
2003). This embodied account of body image predicts that action-
based tasks should be as efficient as semantic-based tasks in the
rehabilitation of body image deficits.
Bodily Experience and Social Skills
Another property of semantic memory—and hence body
semantics—is that it is a shared, collective memory acquired
through social interactions. The fact that similar brain regions
represent the self and others (Kruse et al., 2016) supports the
hypothesis of a socially grounded bodily experience. Besides,
the observation of others shapes the multisensory peripersonal
space (Pellencin et al., 2018). Likewise, the estimated metrics
of someone else’s body depends on social features like gender
(Linkenauger et al., 2017). In this regard, it is likely that attitudes
toward social partners influence bodily experience, especially
since the emotional valence of stimuli has an influence on
movement control (so, perhaps, on body schema; Esteves et al.,
2016). This might imply that the quality of the relationship
between a patient and its physical therapist have a direct effect
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on rehabilitation, in that positive attitudes toward the therapist
may reconfigure peripersonal space in itself.
Bodily Experience and Individual Experience
Studies on body-swapping illusions (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008)
have demonstrated that they are limited (de Vignemont and
Farnè, 2010): The illusion does not work with objects that are
not body-shaped, and the feeling of owning the new body occurs
only from a 1st person perspective (Petkova et al., 2011b).
Nevertheless, with regard to the plasticity of perception (Sachse
et al., 2017), it is probably because we are used to experiment
our body in a 1st person perspective (i.e., the habitual body).
Indeed, body-related tasks are influenced by both individual
habits (Isaac and Marks, 1994), and the experience of either the
first or the third perspective (Edwards et al., 2019). Contrary
to long-standing beliefs, there may be no limit to the plasticity
of bodily experience with the possible exception of experience
(i.e., the habitual body). This “habitual body” might correspond
to the concept of “body model” (i.e., the implicit representation
of the usual size and shape of one’s own body parts), and
can be understood as the phenomenological expression of the
somatotopic organization of the somatosensory cortex (Longo
and Haggard, 2010). It should be acknowledged that the crucial
role of individual experience in stabilizing the body model is not
incompatible with the existence of a basic, innate organization of
the brain acquired through phylogenesis (Longo et al., 2012).
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
NEUROREHABILITATION
As mentioned in the introduction, theoretical options
should have implications for clinical practice, especially
neurorehabilitation. The structuralist account of bodily
experience posits that the latter is an epiphenomenon of both
multisensory integration and cognitive processes that are not
body-specific. On this ground, future research on clinical
syndromes may include extensive testing of both multisensory
and cognitive processing. Indeed, setting up therapies implies
the upstream demonstration of the level of impairment. In the
absence of a consensual, unified framework for the study of
bodily experience (de Vignemont, 2010), this would involve
thorough testing of cognition and body representation.
Furthermore, two strategies could be tested. The first strategy
focusing on multisensory integration would aim at modifying
bodily experience by modulating one or several afferent sensory
inputs (e.g., enrichment or impoverishment). This corresponds
to most of the strategies currently tested based on the now well-
established role of multisensory integration in bodily experience
(e.g., Chokron et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2008; Diers et al., 2013).
A second, complementary strategy based on the interference
hypothesis could consist in testing the influence of non-
specific cognitive processes on abnormal bodily experience.
This could include, at least, perception (e.g., does modifying
the environment of the body modulate bodily experience and
improve symptoms?), action (e.g., does tool use action improve
symptoms?), language (e.g., does talking and thinking modify
bodily experience?), semantics (e.g., does mental imagery of the
body improve symptoms in peripheral syndromes? Does the
modulation of peripheral afferent information help asemantic
patients drawing body parts?), social skills, and emotion (e.g.,
does the empathy or emotional state of the patient have an
impact on symptoms?), and individual experience (e.g., does
the intensity of symptoms vary as a function of previous
individual habits?).
Furthermore, seeing the extensive list of body-related
disorders (de Vignemont, 2010), it seems necessary to test which
therapy is effective on which syndrome. For instance, it is
unlikely that the same strategies may apply to both peripheral
neurological conditions, and syndromes caused by brain lesions.
In return, this could lead to categorize body-related disorders
depending on which therapy is effective, and hence to better
understand the either common or different underlying nature
of seemingly different body-related disorders (e.g., if one and
the same treatment is effective on both eating disorders and
somatoparaphrenia, one might consider that these conditions
share a common denominator). Ultimately, neurorehabilitation
studies could lead to either confirm or invalidate the hypothesis
that bodily experience is an epiphenomenon of multisensory
integration and cognition.
CONCLUSION
The now well-documented permeability of bodily experience and
cognitive functioning raises a critical epistemological issue. On
a cognitive account of bodily experience, one could argue that
body representations exist, and may plastically change during
action (Maravita et al., 2003). Nevertheless, if representations
are plastic to that point, then one may also wonder what the
nature of these representations is, and which specific function
they subserve. An alternative structuralist account would be to
consider body representations as the consequence rather than
the cause of bodily experience and cognition. On this ground,
it is proposed that bodily experience is an epiphenomenon of
multisensory integration (likely the most body-specific process),
and cognition (Figure 1). This is not fully in line with theories
of embodied cognition because it amounts to considering
that cognition shapes the body as much as the body shapes
the mind, whereas embodied cognition accounts generally
posit that the body shapes cognition. Demonstrating abnormal
bodily experience in the context of completely normal sensory,
and cognitive functioning would stand against the hypothesis
defended here.
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